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A New Way Forward in Afghanistan:
A Request for Change in U.S. Policy
by Dr. Sima Samar*

epose the Taliban. Restore freedom and democracy.
Protect women’s rights and human rights. The United
States has always presented its military intervention in
Afghanistan in these simple terms. After the quick ousting of
the Taliban, the signing of the Bonn Agreement brought hope
for pluralistic government and human dignity. Seven years into
Operation Enduring Freedom, however, promises made by the
United States and the international community to the people of
Afghanistan remain largely unfulfilled.
The demands of the Afghan people were not very high; they
included basic notions of human security and freedom to exercise basic human rights. Several strategic mistakes have undercut the achievement of these goals. U.S.-led forces succeeded in
removing the Taliban but failed to eradicate it before diverting
attention to Iraq. Relying on warlords who have no commitment
to democracy to maintain order, U.S. policy over-emphasized
military power at the expense of nation and state building, economic growth, and social development.
On March 26, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama unveiled
his foreign policy plan in Afghanistan. The plan, which centers
around a troop surge, includes military and civil society training,
making deals with certain groups of insurgents, and financial aid
to Pakistan. In its implementation, the plan must not only deal
with the effects of the security vacuum but take a more holistic
approach in addressing the causes of the lack of security. A troop
surge would provide short term security gains but will result in
little enduring change unless complemented with a “development surge.” The United States must reframe its security goals
to encompass the overall human security threat of poverty, and
any political solution must promote basic human rights and
equality.
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Introduction

Head of community development council in a village in Afghanistan.

Subsequently, these groups became increasingly uncontrollable
and transformed into the biggest problem of Afghan society.
The 1992 collapse of the Soviet-backed regime of Dr.
Mohammad Najibullah prompted the second phase. The United
States and western countries lost interest in Afghanistan after the
end of the cold war. Most of the military factions who fought
the Soviet troops and the pro-Soviet government consolidated
their hold on power and began fighting amongst each other. The
warring factions used ethnicity as a divisive weapon and sparked
another round of serious human rights violations. Ignoring such
human rights abuses was the second phase’s strategic mistake.
The third phase began in 1994 with the emergence of the
Taliban in Kandahar. The Afghan people were weary of pervasive lawlessness and of the intense fighting among Mujahideen
groups; the Taliban attracted civilians with the promise of
security provided by confiscating weapons from the various
rival political groups. As soon as the Taliban gained control

Historical Background
Since 1978, three distinct phases have marked the conflicts
in Afghanistan, and U.S. policy mistakes during each phase continue to haunt Afghanistan. The first phase started in 1978 with a
bloody, top-down revolution, and continued through the occupation by the Soviet Union in December 1979. The Soviet occupation resulted in a decade and a half of forced disappearances,
displacement of civilians, mass killings, and political oppression
by the ruling pro-Soviet forces. When the United States and
other western forces chose to support the Afghans’ fight against
the Soviet invasion, they chose the most backward and conservative groups as proxy fighters against the communist regime.

* Dr. Sima Samar is the Chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent
Human Rights Commission.
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Improving Security
Currently, Afghan civilians are sandwiched between international forces and the Taliban. The high numbers of civilian
casualties produced by international action makes it difficult for
Afghans to recognize the friendly purposes of the international
forces; the Taliban and other insurgent groups use this confusion as leverage to manipulate civilians. In conducting military
operations, therefore, both international forces and the Afghan
government must adhere to international humanitarian and
human rights laws and minimize civilian casualties. The troops
must show the Afghan people that the international forces will
protect and restore safety and security.
The security strategy needs to become more organized and
comprehensive. Differences of strategy among the international
community tend to impact the country negatively. The various
Provincial Reconstruction Teams should coordinate with each
other and learn from each others’ successes and failures.
Additionally, the international community should avoid viewing
security in Afghanistan as an isolated problem. A regional solution is required, especially one that includes neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Iran, and Russia. President Obama’s plan
is encouraging because it emphasizes cooperation with Pakistan,
but progress in Pakistan requires resolution of the conflict in the
Kashmir region between Pakistan and India. The continuation of
ethnic and religious conflict in Kashmir provides a focus around
which Islamic extremists can rally and radicalism can grow. The
United States and the international community should engage
Afghanistan’s neighbors with a united approach.
It is cheaper and more sustainable to train and fund Afghan
security forces than to have a continued NATO presence, and
President Obama has pledged additional resources to do so.
Maximizing the effectiveness of those resources requires learning from past mistakes and examining the shortcomings of the
current domestic security apparatus. Traditionally, local police
are underequipped, ill-resourced, and underpaid. Remedying
these shortcomings should be the cornerstone for establishing
a committed and professional Afghan National Police Force
(“ANP”). Mechanisms should be implemented to closely monitor
the ANP and the Afghan National Army (“ANA”) to hold them
accountable for their actions. Quick fixes should be avoided, and
structural support ought not be directed towards tribal militia
or Afghan National Auxiliary police. Similarly, the creation of
an Iraqi-style militia should be avoided because recent history
has shown that militias do not protect the state. Militia member loyalties lie, not with the constitution of Afghanistan, but
with the militia commanders who supply income and employment. Creating tribal militias also sparks more ethnic tension
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of most parts of Afghanistan, they became more violent and
more restrictive of people’s basic freedoms. Although every
Afghan citizen suffered under the Taliban regime, its primary
victims were women and ethnic and religious minorities. During
the Taliban regime, the West’s apathy completely isolated
Afghanistan, turning it into a safe haven for terrorists and into
the world’s biggest opium producer. Although the proxy war in
Afghanistan was won against the communists, it degenerated
into a bloody civil war. Not until after the attacks on the United
States of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) did the world focus again
on the situation in Afghanistan and realize that it had become
al-Qaeda’s playground.

Boys selling bread in a Northern Afghan village.

and undermines important peace-building initiatives such as
the Disarmament, Demilitarization, and Reintegration process
(“DDR”) and the Disband Illegally Armed Groups program
(“DIAG”); both programs transform former soldiers in postconflict regions into civilians.
Achieving lasting peace requires a political solution, but
political solutions should not be limited solely to negotiation
with Taliban and opposition groups. Working with opposition
groups should not overshadow efforts to enhance the capacity
and capability of the existing institutions that are based on good
governance, rule of law, and human rights. Any political negotiation with anti-government elements should not compromise
accountability, justice, and human rights principles, and the
victims of human rights violations should not be victimized for
political gains again and again.

Fighting Poverty
Merely addressing the obvious signs of the lack of security
are insufficient to effectuate enduring change. A “development
surge” must complement the troop surge, and the concept of
security must incorporate overall “human security” and address
the issue of poverty. Fighting poverty requires the rebuilding of
Afghanistan’s physical and social institutions. Such reconstruction efforts require an increase in development aid and its wise
allocation.
A comprehensive, multi-dimensional strategy for the reduction of poverty will reduce the ability of terrorist organizations to
recruit young Afghans and Muslims. We cannot reduce poverty
without investing in education, the primary tool for changing the
mentality of a society. One of the reasons the war in Afghanistan
has been so long and violent is the population’s lack of education. All levels of education need support, including scholarships
for higher education. Greater access to education is especially
important for young girls. Education builds the nation’s human
capacity for reconstructing Afghanistan’s institutions. Health
care must be another focus of the multi-dimensional strategy.
Without access to health care, especially reproductive care and
birth control, poverty reduction is not possible.
The Afghan government needs to increase its own capacity to
utilize international aid and development assistance and enhance
3

Merely addressing the obvious signs of the lack
of security are insufficient to effectuate enduring change.
A “development surge” must complement the troop surge,
and the concept of security must incorporate overall
“human security” and address the issue of poverty.
alone do not guarantee democracy anywhere, especially if they
are not genuine and free.
I believe that increasing the people’s support for the government will minimize the power of anti-government groups.
Political solutions should not marginalize the rights of the
people for the expedience of integrating abusive power-holders.
Nor should human rights principles be sidelined. As the Afghan
government becomes a more assertive advocate of human rights
and good governance, it will increase the likelihood of ending
the culture of impunity and of replacing the law of force with
the force of law.
Sustaining and promoting human rights is necessary for
achieving peace, stability, development, and security. The
protection and promotion of human rights, women’s rights,
and gender equality is an unconditional state responsibility.
Unfortunately, neither the Afghan government nor the international community took the rights-based approach seriously in
the past seven years.
Any public policy that truly intends to achieve peace in
Afghanistan should have human rights and women’s rights at
its center. An important ingredient of peace is justice. Without
justice, the peace-building process will be incomplete and
unsustainable. The government should cut ties with well-known
human rights violators and warlords. The culture of impunity
must end immediately, and everyone should be held accountable
for their actions. The reform of the judiciary system can help
build confidence among the Afghan people in the capabilities of
the government and international community. The Afghan and
U.S. governments need a more comprehensive strategy for promoting human rights, especially women’s rights, in Afghanistan.
Tradition, culture, and religion are no excuse for failing to promote women’s rights and women’s political participation in the
country.

its commitment to carry out the reforms necessary for upholding good governance, rule of law, human rights, and justice. The
government should concentrate on creating job opportunities
for youths and ensuring fair distribution of development projects. Over the past seven years, most development money was
allocated toward the southern provinces where the majority of
violence and drug production occurred; very little was distributed toward more secure regions that do not produce opium. The
government needs to shift to allocation policies that reward good
behavior and build the capacity of stable regions that shelter persons displaced by ongoing war and conflict in other regions.

Building Legitimacy And Good Governance
Establishing a credible, functioning, and responsive government did not receive enough attention over the last seven years.
The Afghan government needs strong political will—and United
States support—to fight corruption and promote accountability
and justice. Free and fair elections and protecting the rights of
women and minority groups are necessary elements to achieving
legitimacy in government.
Promoting democracy through the mechanism of free and
fair elections is essential to solving the problems of countries in
conflict like Afghanistan. The only way to guarantee the sustainability of state institutions is to build the necessary confidence
in our political system. The people of Afghanistan must buy into
the ideas of democracy and power sharing in order for them to
support and protect their elected government. As the August
2009 presidential and 2010 parliamentary elections approach,
every possible effort should be made to ensure they are transparent, free, fair, and on time.
The election protection effort must incorporate security and
transparency at every stage of the process. Enhanced security is
necessary to create an environment that enables participation in
the political process by all Afghans. Fraud and nepotism must be
rooted out of the entire process, from voter registration to election day. Election officials should not allow culture and religion
to undermine the integrity of the voting process. In some areas,
residents claimed they did not want photographs taken of their
women, and election officials allowed male members of the family to register lists of female names. Those male family members
then voted on behalf of the female family members. This both
prevented women from exercising their human rights as citizens
and created an opportunity for mass voter fraud, as officials
never confirmed the existence of the registered names. Elections

Conclusion
President Obama pledged additional troops and resources in
order to foster security and development in Afghanistan. Security
cannot be reached without development, however, and development cannot be sustained without security. Neither security nor
development is possible without respect for human rights and
the full participation of women. U.S. policy in Afghanistan must
endorse these rights-based values and not allow deference to traditional culture and religion to excuse failures to protect human
rights and women’s rights. 		
HRB
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